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HOW MUCH DOES VIOLENCE TAX TRADE?
S. Brock Blomberg and Gregory D. Hess*
Abstract—We investigate the empirical effect of violence, as compared to
other trade impediments, on trade flows. Our analysis is based on a panel
data set with annual observations on 177 countries from 1968 to 1999,
which brings together information from the Rose data set, the ITERATE data
set for terrorist events, and data sets of external and internal conflict. We
explore these data with traditional and theoretical gravity models. We
calculate that, for a given country year, the presence of terrorism together
with internal and external conflict is equivalent to as much as a 30% tariff
on trade. This is larger than estimated tariff-equivalent costs of border and
language barriers and tariff-equivalent reduction through generalized
systems of preference and WTO participation.
I. Introduction
WHAT are the major impediments to trade, and whatcan be done to remove them? In a recent and con-
troversial paper, Andrew Rose (2004) asserts that “while
theory, casual empiricism, and strong statements abound,
there is, to my knowledge, no compelling empirical evi-
dence showing that the GATT/WTO has actually encour-
aged trade.” Several researchers have reexamined this find-
ing, but the general thrust of Rose’s view is well taken—
what are the trade-creating and trade-destroying factors that
affect world trade?1
This question is our paper’s focal point, but with a twist.
The purpose of our paper is to calculate the economic cost
of the effects of violence on trade and compare it with the
economic cost of other trade barriers to see which is larger
in magnitude. We assert that world peace is an important
consideration for trade and one that may actually have a
larger influence than even bilateral trade pacts. Using data
from 177 countries over more than 30 years, we find that
peace has a strong statistical and economic effect on trade.
We estimate the effect of peace to be greater than that of
either multilateral or bilateral trade agreements emanating
from WTO membership or from generalized systems of
preference (GSPs). Moreover, the negative effect of conflict
is greater than language and border effects. These results are
robust across regions, time, and country income groups.
Estimating the trade costs of conflict has received less
attention in the economic literature than the economic
benefits of tariff reduction and nontariff-barrier reduction,
on which there is a vast literature.2 There is, however, a
growing body of literature that explores how conflict affects
economies through two channels—a domestic channel and a
globalization (that is, trade) channel.
Although the purpose of this paper is to concentrate on
analyzing the globalization channel, it is instructive to
consider first the domestic channel.3 The domestic channel
is a basic story of economic allocation. That is, if the
government spends more on the military to quell or to create
conflict, consumption and/or investment may be crowded
out. One consequence of the decrease in investment would
be a decline in future economic growth.4
Recently, Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2005), inves-
tigated the effect of various forms of conflict such as
terrorism, internal wars, and external wars on a country’s
economic growth. They find that, on average, the incidence
of terrorism may have an economically significant negative
effect on growth, albeit one that is considerably smaller and
less persistent than that associated with either external or
internal wars. Terrorism is associated with a redirection of
economic activity away from investment spending and to-
ward government spending. They also find that the effects
are largest in Africa and amongst nondemocratic states.
A second channel by which economic prosperity is af-
fected by conflict is the globalization channel. The tradi-
tional view of the globalization channel is that violence
harms the real economy in the same manner as any trade
cost. In this case, external conflict, internal conflict, or
international terrorist attack leads to a fall in trade, thereby
leading to a decline in aggregate activity and a fall in output.
Put differently, an increase in terrorism in country A in-
creases the cost of doing business with country A, so that
country B will purchase goods or services either domesti-
cally or from another, more peaceful country. Thus, violence
acts as a distorting tax or tariff that limits the attainment of
the benefits from free trade.
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) have pursued this an-
gle, employing corruption and imperfect contract enforce-
ment as impediments to international trade. They find that
omitting indexes of institutional quality obscures the nega-
tive relationship between per capita income and the share of
total expenditure devoted to traded goods. Their paper,
however, does not consider direct measures of conflict.5 In
a complementary study to ours, Glick and Taylor (2005) do
consider the direct effect of very large external wars on
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1 For example, Subramanian and Wei (2005) have shown that the death
of the WTO as a trade promotion device may be overstated, in that the
WTO can improve trade strongly but unevenly.
2 For examples of the benefits to lowering trade barriers see, among
others, Anderson (1979), who championed use of the gravity equation
with different structural models, including Ricardian models, Heckscher-
Ohlin (HO) models, and increasing returns to scale (IRS) models. See also
Eaton and Kortum (2002).
3 There is also the issue of how economic activity affects a nation’s
proclivity toward violence—see Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001a,b) and
Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (forthcoming).
4 Of course, other factors could reduce growth. The rise in uncertainty
from a conflict could make households and firms reduce spending, or the
nation’s productive capacity could be directly affected—for example, see
Blomberg (1996).
5 Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) also analyze some aspects of conflict’s
impact on trade, but over a significantly shorter time horizon.
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trade from a broader historical perspective. However, they
do not consider the effect of terrorism and internal wars on
international trade, and the cost to their analysis of a longer
time period is that it reduces the number of countries for
which data are available.
Our paper investigates the globalization channel by di-
rectly analyzing the effect of all types of conflict on trade.
We employ the workhorse trade model—the gravity mod-
el—to determine the economic benefit of peace. We esti-
mate both a traditional and a theoretical gravity model to
determine the cost of conflict. We divide conflict into
several subcategories to isolate the individual effects of
terrorism (T), external war (E), revolutions (R), and inter-
ethnic fighting (IF) on trade. Furthermore, we also analyze
the aggregate effect of conflict on trade by using factor
analysis to create a synthetic measure of violence (TERIF).
In summary, we find that, in total, violent conflict is a larger
impediment to trade than traditional tariff barriers. This
result should refocus policymakers’ attention on encourag-
ing peace as a trade-promoting device to improve economic
welfare.
II. The Data and Basic Empirical Regularities
We combine data from five different sources for our
project. First, the trade data are obtained from Rose (2004).
This is a bilateral data set on trade flows from 1948 to 1999
that has approximately two hundred thousand dyadic obser-
vations.
The data we use for organized violence come from three
different sources and are given in country-year form, which
we convert to dyadic form.6 We consider four main forms of
organized violence.
The first is terrorism (T), which is adopted from the
ITERATE data set—see Mickolus et al. (1993). For an inter-
national or transnational terrorist event, the definition in
ITERATE is as follows:
the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-
normal violence for political purposes by any individ-
ual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to
established governmental authority, when such action
is intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a
target group wider than the immediate victims and
when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its
perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional
or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its
ramifications transcend national boundaries. (p. 2)
The ITERATE project began as an attempt to quantify char-
acteristics, activities, and influences of transnational terror-
ist groups. The data set is grouped into four categories. First,
there are incident characteristics, which code the timing of
each event. Second, the terrorist characteristics yield infor-
mation about the number, makeup, and groups involved in
the incidents. Third, victim characteristics describe analo-
gous information on the victims involved in the attacks.
Finally, data on life and property losses attempt to quantify
the damage of the attack. Following Blomberg, Hess, and
Orphanides (2005), because we cannot control for the sig-
nificance of individual events, we define a dummy variable
T that takes the value 1 if a terrorist event is recorded for
either country in a given dyad country-year pair. This
measure also has the advantage of defining the incidence of
terrorism in a manner comparable to the incidence of other
forms of conflict in the data set.7
The second type of conflict we consider is external
conflict (E), which is the initiation or escalation of a foreign
policy crisis that results in violence. A foreign policy crisis
is defined by Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser (1988) as
a specific act, event or situational change which leads
decision-makers to perceive a threat to basic values,
time pressure for response and heightened probability
of involvement in military hostilities. A trigger may be
initiated by: an adversary state; a non-state actor; or a
group of states (military alliance). It may be an envi-
ronmental change; or it may be internally generated.
(p. 3)
Based on these criteria, we code E to equal 1 if an external
conflict is recorded for either country involved in the same
dispute in a given dyad country-year pair.8 Such a definition
is also used in Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001a,b),
Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004), and Blomberg et
al. (2005).
Data for revolutions (R) and interethnic fighting (IF) are
obtained from Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (2003). Revolu-
tionary conflict is defined as conflict between the govern-
ment and politically organized groups seeking to overthrow
those in power. Such groups include political parties, labor
organizations, and parts of the regime itself. Note that for
these internal conflicts to be considered, more than 1000
individuals had to be mobilized and 100 fatalities must have
occurred. An example of such a conflict would be the
Chinese Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. Again, R
takes the value 1 if a revolutionary event is recorded for
either country in a given dyad country-year pair.
Interethnic fighting and genocide (IF), is defined to in-
clude the execution, and/or consent of sustained policies by
6 A data appendix that is more detailed is available upon request from the
authors.
7 In Blomberg et al., (2005) we demonstrate that the effects of terrorism
on growth are similar if we use the number of incidents per capita in a
given year as a measure of the incidence of terrorism.
8 E is purposely defined to deal with international issues that the other
conflict data cannot examine due to the manner in which they were
originally constructed (namely, T, R, and IF were not originally defined in
a bilateral manner). E is defined as 1 if there exists a conflict between
trading partners. This is clearly a lower bound, as some countries do not
trade with one another, for example, Israel and Arab countries. Hence,
Israel’s E is about average, whereas Pakistan and India have about two
times the average rate. Uganda’s E is very large due to its limited number
of trading partners.
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governing elites or their agents that result in the deaths of a
substantial portion of a communal group (genocide) or a
politicized noncommunal group (politicide). The victims
counted are noncombatants, and the percentage of those
killed in each group is given more weight than the number
of dead. IF takes the value 1 if an interethnic fighting or
genocide event is recorded for either county in a given dyad
country-year pair.
Finally, in an attempt to capture the broad features of all
the types of conflict in our data, we construct a synthetic
measure of violence from the principal components of the
underlying factors of violence. Such a method has been used
in other contexts in cross-country analysis, such as that of
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatn (2000). Specifically,
we create a measure of TERIF that is obtained from the
largest principal component from a principal-components
model that is a linear combination of T, E, R, and IF. In
short, the first principal component explains the largest
fraction of the variation in the underlying data, and hence
we focus on that as our synthetic measure of the dyad’s
overall measure of latent conflict. Formally, let TERIFijt
represent dyad ij’s unobserved level of terror from factors T,
E, R, and IF, so that
TERIFijt  1  Tijt  2  Eijt  3  Rijt
(1)
 4  IFijt  ijt.
Using this principal-components model, we estimate
TERIF by employing information from our four different
measures of conflict, T, E, R, and IF. The model optimally
selects one factor with the relevant output. From this anal-
ysis, the factor TERIF is given as
TERIFijt  0.41873  NTijt  0.04526  NEijt
(2)
 0.58256  NRijt  0.50414  NIFijt,
where N (  ) standardizes the variable to be standard
normal. Given the relative frequencies of each underlying
factor, it is not surprising that more weight is associated
with T, R, and IF than with E.
In summary, we have constructed various measures of
violence to include terrorism (T), external conflict (E),
revolutions (R), interethnic fighting (IF), and an amalgam-
ated measure (TERIF).
The basic cross-national and time properties of conflict
have been well documented in Blomberg et al. (2005).9 Four
main facts are shown in the violence data. First, terrorism
occurs more frequently than other forms of violence, with
the greatest incidence occurring in the Americas and Eu-
rope.10 But before concluding that there is a causal relation-
ship between rich democracies and terrorism, it is worth
noting that two of the highest-incidence countries, France
and Germany, are geographically, politically, and econom-
ically close to Nordic countries such as Sweden, Norway,
and Finland with virtually no terrorism. Hence, the relation-
ship is not straightforward.
Second, other forms of internal conflict (R and IF) have
been most persistent in nondemocratic regimes and in low-
income countries. A possible interpretation is that many
nondemocratic and/or low-income countries are inundated
with internal strife and that that conflict may explain, in
large part, why certain countries fail to advance.
Third, external wars are much less frequent, largely due
to the high cost of waging such a war. This is possibly why
others, such as Blomberg et al. (2005), find that they have
the largest negative impact on growth. Ceteris paribus, a
shock from external war is less frequent but extremely
harmful to an economy.11
Fourth, and perhaps most interestingly for this paper,
violence was falling for the last part of the time sample. This
is best shown in figure 1. This figure depicts the sum of
averages for each country of T, E, R, and IF from 1968 to
1999.12 Notice the increase in the trend of violence until the
early 1990s, when there is a large downward swing.13 This
is noteworthy because trade tended to rise precisely at the
same time. There are a variety of possible explanations for
this, but one would be the general democratization and
realignment in a post–Cold War world. As countries moved
to more peaceful postures both internally and externally,
trade improved as the cost of doing business fell. It is
important to note that this swing occurred at a distinct point
in time, whereas other international movements to encour-
age trade, such as the ascendency of WTO, have been more
gradual. Hence, this suggests that peace, rather than statu-
tory promotion, plays an important role in encouraging
trade.
To investigate these points further, in figure 2A and B we
provide several unconditional and conditional cross-country
scatterplots to understand better the gross features of trade,
trade promotion, and conflict. Figure 2A demonstrates these
relationships in a cross section by averaging trade (the
vertical axis) and trade promotion (the horizontal axis) from
1968 to 1999. ONEIN denotes that one country is a member
of the WTO, and BOTHIN denotes that both are, and GSP
denotes whether the countries have a GSP arrangement.
Each point on the figure reflects the time average of the
9 A detailed data appendix is available from the authors upon request.
10 This is partly because terrorism is measured rather crudely in ITERATE
and partly because a terrorist event has relatively low cost for most
insurgents.
11 Because it is infrequent, however, external conflict’s effect on eco-
nomic activity is not always precisely estimated.
12 The general behavior of the sum is practically identical to that of the
factor TERIF once TERIF is aggregated across countries.
13 Enders and Sandler (2005) show that there has been no statistical
increase in terrorism since September 11, 2001. If anything, they show
that there was a decline in hostage taking in the 1990s.
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dyadic variables. The unconditional correlation is a simple
scatterplot, whereas the conditional correlation is a partial
correlation mapped directly from a traditional gravity model
[as described in the next section—see equation (3)]. Figure
2A validates the results in Rose (2004) by showing that
WTO membership does not help trade, and if anything
hinders it. On the other hand, GSPs do tend to encourage
trade in both the conditional and the unconditional plots.
Figure 2B provides cross-country plots of trade (the
vertical axis) and measures of conflict (the horizontal axis).
Here we simply measure violence by a rank ordering of
countries by violence (for example, T, R, and TERIF) as the
regressor.14 In this case, paradoxically, violence tends to be
positively related to trade in the unconditional model. How-
ever, such analysis is impressionistic in that many factors,
such as colonization and income, are not included in the
unconditional distribution. Once these factors have been
allowed for, we see something quite different. Importantly,
the conditional plots demonstrate negative effects of vio-
lence on trade in each case. Moreover the effect is statisti-
cally significant for R and TERIF, even though these effects
may be diminished by time averaging.
To summarize, there appears to be a negative relationship
between violence and trade, both in the time domain (Figure
1) and across countries (Figure 2A and B). In the following
section, we attempt to sort out these effects of violence on
trade.
III. Empirical Specification and Results
This section of the paper analyzes the empirical effect of
violence on bilateral international trade. We first examine
the effect for the traditional gravity model, and then for the
theoretical gravity model. We then turn to evaluating the
tarifflike effect of violence on trade, and then to demon-
strating the robustness of our findings.
We begin our investigation with the traditional gravity
model of trade, which is a conventional device used to
estimate determinants of trade based on geography and
history. Such a workhorse model incorporates how common
borders and histories are important in determining trade
between any two countries. Formally, the empirical speci-
fication of our augmented traditional gravity model is
ln Xijt  0  1  LDISTij  2 lnRGDPit  RGDPjt
 3 lnRGDPit  RGDPjtPOPit  POPjt 
 4  COMLANGij  5  BORDERij
 9  COMCOLONYij
 10  CURCOLONYij (3)
 11  COLONYij  12  COMCURijt
 13  REGIONALijt    Z
 1  BOTHINijt
14 Similar plots can be made with E and IF, but are omitted here to
reduce clutter.
FIGURE 1.—TIME SERIES AVERAGES OF TERROR AND TRADE OVER 177 COUNTRIES
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 2  ONEINijt  3  GSPijt
   VIOLENCEijt  εijt,
where i, j denote trading partners i and j, and t denotes time.
The economic variables are defined as follows: X is the
average value of real bilateral trade (exportsimports) di-
vided by GDP, RGDP is the real gross domestic product,
POP is the population, and LDIST is the natural log of the
distance between two countries.15 The descriptive and geo-
graphic variables are defined as follows: COMLANG is a
15 As in Rose (2004), this is measured as the average value of bilateral
trade from country i to j from FOB exports and CIF imports, deflated by
the United States CPI.
FIGURE 2.—THE EFFECT OF (A) TRADE PROMOTION AND (B) VIOLENCE ON TRADE
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dummy variable that is equal to 1 if countries have a
common language and 0 otherwise, COLONY is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if countries were ever colonies
before 1945, CURCOLONY a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 if countries were colonized by the given year, COM-
CUR is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if both countries
use the same currency, BORDER is a dummy variable for
whether the countries share a border, REGIONAL is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if both countries belong to
the same regional trade agreement, and Z is a vector
comprising a comprehensive set of time and dyad fixed
effects.16 The trade variables are defined as follows:
BOTHIN is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if both
16 Of course, when these dyad fixed effects are included, other variables
such as BORDER cannot be estimated separately.
FIGURE 2.—CONTINUED
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countries are members of WTO, ONEIN is a dummy vari-
able that is equal to 1 if one country is a member of WTO,
and GSP is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if both
countries are a part of a GSP. VIOLENCE is a measure of
organized violence that can include terrorism (T), external
war (E), revolution and coups (R), and interethnic conflict
and genocide (IF). TERIF is the principal component from
the factor model described above.17
Table 1 presents a comprehensive set of regression results
for the traditional gravity model. The results in the first
column generally replicate those in Rose (2004). This base-
line specification has four noteworthy features. First, all the
standard control variables for common language, common
currency, colonial status, distance, and so on are of the
expected sign and are statistically significant. Second, the
income terms are also of the expected sign (positive) and
statistically significant. Third, the presence of a regional
trade agreement and a GSP raises bilateral trade and does so
in an economically and statistically significant way. How-
ever, as emphasized by Rose (2004), membership in the
WTO is statistically significant but with the incorrect sign:
namely, membership by one country or both countries in the
WTO lowers trade. As noted by Subramanian and Wei
(2005), however, the results in column 2 of table 1 demon-
strate that when one includes country fixed effects, the signs
of the coefficients on BOTHIN and ONEIN become positive
rather than negative, and are statistically significant. It is
also worthwhile to note that the coefficient associated with
GDP is cut in half once these effects are included.
Beginning with column 3 of table 1, we explore the direct
effect of violence on bilateral trade. Columns 3 through 6
successively include our measures of terrorism, external
conflict, revolutions, and interethnic fighting in the empiri-
cal specification, and all four measures of conflict are
included in the results in column 7. The results in these five
columns, which include country and time fixed effects,
demonstrate three key findings that will be shown to be
17 These variables are coded so that the dummy variables are equal to 1
if either country has experienced an episode of violence of the type
considered. This issue is examined further in table 4 below.
TABLE 1.—PANEL REGRESSION: TRADE AND VIOLENCE USING TRADITIONAL GRAVITY MODEL
Variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Rose C.E. T E R IF All TERIF D.E.
BOTHIN 	0.107***
[0.023]
0.265***
[0.058]
0.262***
[0.058]
0.265***
[0.058]
0.251***
[0.058]
0.258***
[0.058]
0.243***
[0.058]
0.244***
[0.058]
0.170***
[0.054]
ONEIN 	0.084***
[0.024]
0.119**
[0.056]
0.118**
[0.056]
0.119**
[0.056]
0.112**
[0.056]
0.116**
[0.056]
0.110**
[0.056]
0.111**
[0.056]
0.078
[0.050]
GSP 0.698***
[0.095]
0.509***
[0.032]
0.510***
[0.032]
0.509***
[0.032]
0.509***
[0.032]
0.510***
[0.032]
0.510***
[0.032]
0.511***
[0.032]
0.122***
[0.026]
LDIST 	1.203***
[0.065]
	1.391***
[0.026]
	1.391***
[0.026]
	1.391***
[0.026]
	1.391***
[0.026]
	1.391***
[0.026]
	1.391***
[0.026]
	1.391***
[0.026]
LRGDP 0.851***
[0.022]
0.304***
[0.046]
0.312***
[0.046]
0.304***
[0.046]
0.308***
[0.046]
0.302***
[0.046]
0.314***
[0.046]
0.316***
[0.046]
0.646***
[0.042]
LRGDPPC 0.445***
[0.038]
0.207***
[0.047]
0.198***
[0.047]
0.207***
[0.047]
0.195***
[0.047]
0.207***
[0.047]
0.188***
[0.047]
0.187***
[0.047]
	0.093**
[0.044]
REGIONAL 0.276***
[0.051]
0.278***
[0.019]
0.277***
[0.019]
0.278***
[0.019]
0.277***
[0.019]
0.277***
[0.019]
0.276***
[0.019]
0.276***
[0.019]
0.049***
[0.015]
CUSTRICT 1.129***
[0.042]
1.181***
[0.147]
1.181***
[0.148]
1.181***
[0.147]
1.184***
[0.147]
1.181***
[0.147]
1.184***
[0.147]
1.183***
[0.148]
0.512***
[0.149]
COMLANG 0.305***
[0.013]
0.288***
[0.047]
0.288***
[0.047]
0.288***
[0.047]
0.288***
[0.047]
0.288***
[0.047]
0.287***
[0.047]
0.287***
[0.047]
BORDER 0.420***
[0.027]
0.385***
[0.107]
0.384***
[0.107]
0.388***
[0.107]
0.385***
[0.107]
0.384***
[0.107]
0.387***
[0.107]
0.385***
[0.107]
COMCOL 0.630***
[0.021]
0.571***
[0.070]
0.570***
[0.070]
0.571***
[0.070]
0.570***
[0.070]
0.571***
[0.070]
0.570***
[0.070]
0.569***
[0.070]
CURCOL 1.720***
[0.118]
0.558
[0.394]
0.561
[0.395]
0.558
[0.395]
0.564
[0.390]
0.556
[0.394]
0.565
[0.390]
0.564
[0.391]
0.103
[0.327]
COLONY 1.461***
[0.025]
1.234***
[0.100]
1.235***
[0.100]
1.234***
[0.100]
1.234***
[0.100]
1.234***
[0.100]
1.234***
[0.100]
1.234***
[0.100]
T 	0.051***
[0.014]
	0.043***
[0.014]
E 	0.393
[0.287]
	0.367
[0.288]
R 	0.187***
[0.031]
	0.168***
[0.032]
IF 	0.151***
[0.039]
	0.126***
[0.039]
TERIF 	0.071***
[0.010]
	0.081***
[0.008]
Observations 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228
R-squared 0.63 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.86
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country pair are presented in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The results in this table are estimated
from equation (1) for 177 countries from 1968 to 1999. Models 2 through 8 include country and time fixed effects. Models 1 through 9 are the basic gravity model adding separately the different forms of terror:
the terror index (TERIFF), terrorism (T), external wars (E), revolutions (R), and interethnic fights or genocides (IF). Model 9 includes only dyad fixed effects.
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robust throughout the remainder of our paper. First, conflict
has a statistically significant and robust negative effect on
bilateral trade flows. Second, different types of conflict have
different negative effects on trade. For example, a country
thathasa terrorist incident is associatedwitha5.1-percentage-
point decline in bilateral trade. Though this is an important
effect, it is less than half as large as the negative effect on
trade from revolutions and interethnic conflict, which are
associated with declines of 19 and 15 percentage points,
respectively. Third, though external conflict is associated
with a tremendous decline in trade, the estimate is not
statistically significant.18 As noted in Blomberg et al.
(2005), the difficulty in estimating the effect of external
conflict on economic activity is that external wars are
infrequent, that many countries that have faced the greatest
costs of external conflict (such as Afghanistan and Iraq)
simply do not have reliable data, and that countries that get
into external conflict with one another usually do not trade
much with each other.19 The results in column 7, where all
measures of violence are included, demonstrate remarkably
similar findings to when each measure is included sepa-
rately.
The results in columns 8 through 9 of table 1 demon-
strates the robustness of these findings on violence when we
use our summary measure of violence from factor analysis,
TERIF. The results in column 8 suggest that a 1-standard-
deviation shock to the TERIF indicator is associated with a
7.1-percentage-point decline in bilateral trade. The results in
column 9 demonstrate that this finding is robust to the
inclusion of dyadic fixed effects.20
As an alternative to estimating the effects of violence on
trade in a traditional gravity equation, one can estimate the
theoretical counterpart of the above gravity equation,
namely,
lnRGDPit  RGDPjtXijt 0  1  LDISTij
 4  COMLANGij
 5  BORDERij
 9  COMCOLONYij
 10  CURCOLONYij
 11  COLONYij
 12  COMCURijt (4)
 13  REGIONALijt
   Z
 1  BOTHINijt
 2  ONEINijt
 3  GSPijt
   VIOLENCEijt  εijt,
and include country dummies to control for multilateral
resistance terms (see Feenstra, 2002). Notice that the re-
strictions on the traditional gravity equation (3) that produce
the theoretical gravity equation are that 2 
 1 and 3 
 0.
Table 2 provides the estimation results for the effect of
violence in a theoretical gravity model. The results in this
table differ somewhat from those for the traditional gravity
specification in table 1. For the most part, however, the
estimated coefficients, excluding for the moment those for
the measures of violence, are largely unaffected by adopting
the theoretical specification rather than the traditional spec-
ification. Most importantly, the effects of violence as mea-
sured by terrorism and revolutions become much larger (and
negative), whereas that for inter-ethnic fighting actually
becomes smaller. Overall, however, the measures of vio-
lence significantly reduce international trade, with the con-
tinuing exception of external conflict.
Although it is important to understand the negative trade
consequences of conflict, it is also important to obtain some
perspective on how conflict compares to other impediments
to trade. If we were to consider violence to be a tariff (that
is, a tax) on trade, how big a tariff would it be?21 Fortu-
nately, there is a methodology to help us study this very
question. Following earlier studies, Feenstra (2002) demon-
strates that any tariff barrier  can be related to deep
parameters in the utility function as exp{} 
 exp{ˆ /(1 	
)}, where  is the elasticity of substitution between do-
mestic and foreign goods and ˆ is the estimated effect of a
particular variable on international trade. Maximizing a
CES utility function subject to resource constraints yields
the following estimating relationship between trade and
tariff costs :
ln XijtRGDPijt 0  1   LDISTij
 1   ln ijt  1  ln pi (5)
 1   ln pj  1 εijt,
18 Our limited data availability could be one reason that we find little
statistical significance for external war’s effect on trade. During the period
1968–1999, there are relatively few external wars. Others, most notably
Glick and Taylor (2005) and Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2005), with
longer time horizons, do find a significant effect of war on trade.
19 Another factor may be related to the coding of the external conflict
dummy. The data given makes no distinction as to whether the pair
members are adversaries, are possible allies, or are involved in separate
wars with third countries. This issue is partially addressed in table 4 by
decomposing the effect into variables—ONEE and BOTHE—which
should control to some extent for alliances.
20 The dyadic fixed effects are not included in the calculation of R-
squared.
21 This tax measures the pure distortion and does not incorporate the
further unfortunate consequence that it would be a tax that generated zero
direct revenue.
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where  is the CES parameter,  is the effect of distance on
transportation cost, and p are prices. This specification has
the added benefit of allowing us to calculate the tariff cost
associated with T, E, R, and IF versus other widely accepted
costs such as border effects, language, and colony effects.
Unfortunately, tariff costs are unobservable. Instead we
observe multilateral resistance terms, such as borders and
conflicts, that are given as a vector of dummy variables,
Dij 
 (COMLANGij, BORDERij, COMCOLij, CURCOLij,
COLONYij, CUSTRICTij, REGIONALij, BOTHINij, ONEINij,
GSPij), so that our empirical representation is actually
ln  XijtRGDPijt 1  LDISTij  Dijt  εijt (6)
with country dummies and intercepts suppressed in the
exposition (but included in the regression) to control for
price terms. Combining these two expressions, we get D 

(1 	 ) ln , so that for any given resistance term, we can
calculate the tariff equivalent by substituting elasticity val-
ues, that is,  
 /(1	).
Unfortunately, in order to implement this calculation, the
elasticity of substitution, , must be separately provided. It
is straightforward to see that  scales the estimated effects
up and down so that an increase in  lowers the estimated
trade effect from any impediment to trade. Based on empir-
ical research, however, such as in Anderson and Van Win-
coop (2003), it is typical for researchers to calculate these
tariff-equivalent factors using values of  equal to 5 and 10.
In table 3, we provide these estimated effects on trade of
the usual suspects and our measures of violence. The first
five columns report the estimates with a lower bound of 5
for the CES elasticity, 5 and the last five columns report the
estimates with an upper bound of 10.
We begin by analyzing the effects of the usual suspects
and trade. Table 3 reports that regional trade agreements and
currency unions have the most positive effects on trade,
approximately at 12% to 28%, respectively, depending on
the elasticity. These effects are similar to what has been
found by Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) and have a larger
magnitude than any in the standard tariff-equivalent trade
cost literature. Common-language tariff-equivalent trade
costs have a magnitude of approximately 4% to 9%, which
is a few percent below what is found in the literature (see
Eaton & Korum, 2002). However, this is largely explained
by our inclusion of the previously ignored colony dummies
(COMCOL, CURCOL, and COLONY), each costing a tariff
TABLE 2.—PANEL REGRESSION: TRADE AND VIOLENCE—THEORETICAL MODEL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Rose C.E. T E R IF All TERIF D.E.
BOTHIN 	0.187***
[0.024]
0.099*
[0.056]
0.097***
[0.030]
0.099*
[0.056]
0.088
[0.056]
0.092
[0.056]
0.082***
[0.030]
0.082
[0.056]
0.062
[0.053]
ONEIN 	0.116***
[0.024]
0.024
[0.055]
0.024
[0.022]
0.024
[0.055]
0.019
[0.055]
0.021
[0.055]
0.018
[0.022]
0.018
[0.055]
0.013
[0.050]
GSP 0.994***
[0.010]
0.489***
[0.032]
0.490***
[0.016]
0.489***
[0.032]
0.488***
[0.032]
0.489***
[0.032]
0.490***
[0.016]
0.490***
[0.032]
0.067***
[0.026]
LDIST 	1.261***
[0.007]
	1.392***
[0.026]
	1.392***
[0.008]
	1.392***
[0.026]
	1.392***
[0.026]
	1.392***
[0.026]
	1.392***
[0.008]
	1.392***
[0.026]
REGIONAL 0.363***
[0.045]
0.279***
[0.020]
0.279***
[0.007]
0.280***
[0.020]
0.279***
[0.020]
0.279***
[0.020]
0.278***
[0.007]
0.278***
[0.020]
0.042***
[0.015]
CUSTRICT 0.845***
[0.045]
1.180***
[0.148]
1.179***
[0.046]
1.180***
[0.148]
1.182***
[0.148]
1.179***
[0.148]
1.181***
[0.046]
1.181***
[0.148]
0.494***
[0.140]
COMLANG 0.428***
[0.014]
0.288***
[0.047]
0.288***
[0.014]
0.289***
[0.047]
0.288***
[0.047]
0.288***
[0.047]
0.288***
[0.014]
0.288***
[0.047]
BORDER 	0.048*
[0.027]
0.380***
[0.108]
0.379***
[0.029]
0.383***
[0.108]
0.379***
[0.108]
0.379***
[0.108]
0.381***
[0.029]
0.380***
[0.108]
COMCOL 0.705***
[0.021]
0.570***
[0.070]
0.569***
[0.020]
0.570***
[0.070]
0.569***
[0.070]
0.570***
[0.070]
0.569***
[0.020]
0.569***
[0.070]
CURCOL 2.285***
[0.119]
0.587
[0.390]
0.591***
[0.140]
0.588
[0.390]
0.593
[0.387]
0.585
[0.390]
0.594***
[0.140]
0.594
[0.387]
0.137
[0.335]
COLONY 1.371***
[0.027]
1.239***
[0.101]
1.240***
[0.037]
1.239***
[0.101]
1.239***
[0.101]
1.239***
[0.101]
1.239***
[0.037]
1.239***
[0.101]
T 	0.058***
[0.011]
	0.052***
[0.011]
E 	0.375
[0.291]
	0.354*
[0.205]
R 	0.140***
[0.031]
	0.120***
[0.018]
IF 	0.134***
[0.039]
	0.115***
[0.022]
TERIF 	0.061***
[0.010]
	0.069***
[0.008]
Observations 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228
R-squared 0.25 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.74
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country pair are presented in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The results in this table are estimated
from equation (2) for 177 countries from 1968 to 1999. Column 1 is the basic theoretical gravity model. Columns 2–7 are the theoretical gravity model including country and time fixed effects. Columns 8–9 include
the factor TERIFF, first with country and time fixed effects, then with dyad and time fixed effects alone.
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equivalent of 6% to 27% percent of trade.22 Finally, adding
all of these trade costs together, we find that the tariff
equivalent of trade costs is between 50% and 100%, which
is consistent with what has been found by Eaton and Korum
(2002). However, the other usual cost, national border
barriers, is found to have the tariff-equivalent price of 4% to
9%.23
In general, our estimates of the gravity equation are
reasonably consistent across the different measures of trade
costs. This is important when considering the tariff equiv-
alent trade cost of violence in table 3. We estimate that some
forms of violence such as terrorism, revolutions, or inter-
ethnic fighting have a smaller cost (1% to 3%), whereas
other forms such as external war have a larger cost (4% to
10%). Taking them together, we estimate the tariff-
equivalent cost of violence to be between 7% and 17%. This
is higher than the costs from language and border barriers
and significantly higher than the benefits from GSPs and
WTO/GATT membership.
In table 4 we reexplore our earlier findings for the effect
of violence on trade. In particular, we parse out the mea-
sures of terrorism, external conflict, revolutions, and inter-
ethnic fighting, so that we take account of whether just one
of the two countries is experiencing this type of conflict, or
both are simultaneously engaged. For example, ONET is a
dummy variable equal to 1 only if at least one of the two
countries experienced an episode of terrorism in a given
year, and BOTHT is a dummy variable for whether both
countries did. Similarly, ONEE, BOTHE, ONER, BOTHR,
ONEIF, and BOTHIF are defined for external conflict,
revolutions, and interethnic fighting. In each of the first five
columns of table 4 we report regression results using the
traditional gravity equation in equation (3); in columns 6
through 10 we report the results when the theoretical gravity
equation in equation (4) is estimated.
Column 1 presents the estimation results for terrorism’s
effect on trade. Terrorism, whether felt by one country or
both countries, appears to lower international trade by
approximately the same amount, 4 percentage points. Sec-
ond, if just one country is engaged in an external war, this
appears to lower bilateral trade by a similar amount. The
result, however, for whether both countries are in an exter-
nal conflict is not statistically different from 0, probably for
the same reasons for which external conflict was not signif-
icant in tables 1 and 2—namely, this occurs very infrequent-
ly.24 Thirdly, revolutions limit trade, but especially so if both
countries face revolutions, as that is associated with a
40-percentage-point reduction. Finally, if one country is
engaged in interethnic fighting, this is associated with a
12-percentage-point decline in trade, though the effect on
trade if both face such a type of conflict is not statistically
significant, probably for the reason that such a scenario is
very rare.
The results from the theoretical gravity specification in
columns 6 through 10 of table 4 are very similar to those in
the first five columns, with the exception that the effect of
violence on trade may be larger. For example, in column 6,
where we estimate the theoretical gravity specification, the
effect of terrorism is larger, and significantly larger still if
22 We also estimated the regression without colony costs (not reported
here) and found similar magnitudes of the tariff-equivalent cost of lan-
guage to those of Eaton and Korum (2002). Our general results do not
depend on the inclusion or exclusion of colony costs. We include them
because they demonstrate a cost not previously reported in the literature
and to prevent omitted variable bias.
23 Note that these estimates are approximately half of what others have
reported—see Feenstra (2002). Two explanations are possible: First, the
data sample in the literature has typically examined inter- and intrana-
tional trade, which our paper does not. The loss in variation in our sample
could easily bias the estimates downward. Second, the country choice in
our sample is much larger. The first paper in the literature only examined
trade in Canada and the United States. The inclusion of many countries
without a border in our sample could also explain the smaller number.
24 ONEE occurs in approximately 1.5% of the observations, whereas
BOTHE occurs in 0.04%.
TABLE 3.—TARIFF EQUIVALENT TRADE COSTS
 
 5  
 10
T E R IF All T E R IF All
BOTHIN 	21.35 	21.14 	21.26 	21.38 	21.56 	8.98 	8.90 	8.94 	8.99 	9.07
ONEIN 	10.52 	10.52 	10.54 	10.63 	10.60 	4.54 	4.54 	4.56 	4.59 	4.58
GSP 6.64 6.50 6.69 6.50 6.81 3.01 2.94 3.03 2.94 3.08
REGIONAL 24.36 24.65 24.52 24.61 24.29 11.67 11.82 11.75 11.80 11.63
CUSTRICT 27.66 27.67 27.71 27.67 27.69 13.40 13.41 13.43 13.41 13.42
COMLANG 7.13 7.16 7.13 7.16 7.11 3.24 3.25 3.24 3.25 3.22
BORDER 8.81 8.90 8.84 8.84 8.86 4.02 4.06 4.03 4.03 4.04
COMCOL 13.02 13.04 13.02 13.04 13.00 6.01 6.02 6.01 6.02 6.00
CURCOL 22.57 22.43 22.43 22.43 22.57 10.74 10.68 10.68 10.68 10.74
COLONY 27.33 27.31 27.29 27.33 27.31 13.23 13.22 13.21 13.23 13.22
T 	1.46 	1.31 	0.65 	0.58
E 	9.83 	9.25 	4.25 	4.01
R 	3.56 	3.05 	1.57 	1.34
IF 	3.41 	2.92 	1.50 	1.29
TERROR 	1.46 	9.83 	3.56 	3.41 	16.52 	0.65 	4.25 	1.57 	1.50 	7.22
Notes: See table 2. The results in this table are estimated from equation (2) for 177 countries from 1968 to 1999. The first five columns are the basic theoretical gravity model effects by individually and then
jointly including measures of conflict assuming a CES elasticity of 5. The final five columns are the basic theoretical gravity model effects by individually and then jointly including measures of conflict assuming
a CES elasticity of 10. VIOLENCE is the sum of T, E, R, and IF. Each number represents a tariff-equivalent percentage.
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both countries face terrorism. Indeed, on average the effect
is approximately 20% larger. One exception, however, is
that the effect of external war on trade is no longer statis-
tically significant. Of course, the additional bonus for esti-
mating the theoretical gravity specification is that one can
interpret the tariff-equivalent effect of violence on trade. As
demonstrated in column 10, violence is equivalent approx-
imately to a 30% tariff, which for  
 5 is larger than the
effect presented in table 3 (17%).
There are some caveats in making such comparisons,
however. First, the violence episodes may be temporary,
lasting only a few years, whereas geographic, policy, and
other barriers to trade tend to be more persistent. Thus, even
if the estimated coefficients in a gravity model are similar,
in a present-value sense the costs of violence should be
considered lower than those of most other trade barriers.
Second, the upper-end estimate of the aggregate flow
tariff-equivalent costs of violence may overstate these costs.
The estimates reported in table 4 presume that a country is
involved in or exposed to all of these forms of violence at
the same time. On the one hand, this makes sense to the
extent to which at least one country in the world every year
is the locus of each of these forms of violence; this will
indeed affect trade with all of the trade partners of these
violent countries. But the total effect includes effects from
the BOTH and ONE forms of violence, which are mutually
exclusive.
As the results in table 4 demonstrate, our baseline esti-
mates of the traditional gravity specification in equation (3),
reported in table 1, are robust across the modifications
considered in tables 2 and 4. In table 5, however, we
examine further the robustness of our result on the effect of
conflict on trade across different regions and time periods.
Columns 1 through 7 of table 5 report the results from a
traditional gravity specification where we include the factor
index TERIF in each specification.25 As can be seen from
the appropriate rows of the table, the estimate is statistically
significant at below the 0.01 level in all cases, and the
coefficient estimates vary from 	0.039 in high-income
countries to 	0.102 in East Asia. Columns 8 and 9 explore
the effect of violence on trade when we split the sample in
1983. Interestingly, the estimated effect is much lower,
though still statistically significant at the 10% level, for the
1968–1983 subsample. The coefficient is 4 times larger for
the second half of the sample. This may be because, even
though the number of incidents has fallen in the most recent
past, the percentage of those that resulted in casualties has
risen slightly (Enders & Sandler, 2005).
Columns 10–12 continue to demonstrate the robustness
of our results. Column 10 considers including country fixed
effects interacted with time fixed effects as a further control
for multilateral resistance terms. Due to computational dif-
ficulties, we were only able to consider interacting the
country dummies with decade dummies. It is interesting
that, if anything, the coefficient associated with violence
becomes larger in magnitude. Column 11 addresses the
issue of dynamics and lag structure. As it is possible that
25 The regions we consider are South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East
and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and high- and
low-income countries. The last classification is from Rose (2004) and is
obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators.
TABLE 4.—TRADE AND VIOLENCE: TREATING VIOLENCE DIFFERENTLY
Variable
Traditional Gravity Model Theoretical Gravity Model
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
T E R IF All T E R IF All
ONET 	0.052***
[0.015]
	0.049***
[0.015]
	0.059***
[0.011]
	0.057***
[0.015]
BOTHT 	0.039**
[0.016]
	0.031*
[0.016]
	0.052***
[0.016]
	0.046***
[0.016]
ONEE 	0.019*
[0.012]
	0.014
[0.013]
	0.007
[0.013]
	0.004
[0.013]
BOTHE 	0.38
[0.288]
	0.373
[0.288]
	0.37
[0.292]
	0.365
[0.292]
ONER 	0.149***
[0.029]
	0.134***
[0.029]
	0.104***
[0.029]
	0.088***
[0.029]
BOTHR 	0.441***
[0.156]
	0.421***
[0.155]
	0.365**
[0.159]
	0.342**
[0.158]
ONEIF 	0.118***
[0.036]
	0.091**
[0.036]
	0.108***
[0.036]
	0.090**
[0.036]
BOTHIF 	0.088
[0.173]
	0.039
[0.173]
	0.087
[0.174]
	0.056
[0.175]
Total effect 	2.81 	9.88 	12.44 	5.00 	29.95
Obs. 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228 199,228
R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.47
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The results in this table are estimated from either equation
(1) or (2) for 177 countries from 1968 to 1999. Columns 1–5 are for the basic gravity model. Columns 6–10 are for the theoretical gravity model including country fixed effects. The coefficient associated with ONEx
measures the effect if one of the dyad pair has conflict type x. The coefficient associated with BOTHx measures the effect if both of the dyad pair have conflict type x. None of the control variables are reported.
Total effect is the estimated effect on trade from all terror variables with  
 5.
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violence has a delayed effect on trade, we add a lag of TERIF
to the regression. The contemporaneous effect is seen to be
larger, though both current and lagged effects are negative and
statistically significant. Finally, column 12 considers an alter-
native model and data for trade, following Subramanian and
Wei (2005). This specification employs unidirectional trade
(that is, country A’s imports from country B) as the left-side
variable and modifies the regression by including importer and
exporter fixed effects along with separate effects for GDP and
GDP per capita.26 The estimated effect of TERIF continues to
be negative, statistically significant, and in line with the pre-
viously reported regressions.
As a final step, we consider the issue of endogeneity. If
peace can improve trade, then it is possible that trade can
cause peace. Indeed, some of the political science literature
discusses the issue of whether trade has a substantial benefit
in reducing interstate violence—among other papers in this
vast literature, see Mansfield (1994) and Oneal and Russett
(1999). To consider this possibility, we estimate the tradi-
tional gravity equation and use instruments for violence
through the strategic components of trade. In this case, we
instrument for conflict using UN voting records as in Ben-
nett and Stam (1999). Table 6 reports the results from this
estimation. In this case, we again find a strong negative
effect of violence on trade. Note that the magnitudes of the
coefficients are somewhat larger, although there is no evi-
dence of misspecification, as the overidentifying restrictions
are not rejected in any of the specifications. These instru-
ments appear to be rather strong as well. Though not
reported, the results from first-stage regression show that the
coefficients associated with UN voting records are statisti-
cally significant at the 0.01 level in each case. Hence, our
earlier results on the tariff cost withstand the scrutiny of
exogeneity.
IV. Conclusions
Our work follows that of Rose (2004), who shows that
many of the usual suspects in determining the magnitude of
26 We did not employ this methodology and data throughout, for there
are several problems with the data in Subramanian and Wei (2004). For
example, the data are only given in 5-year intervals, and all small trade
observations are excluded. Hence, much of the interesting information is
dropped when using their data.
TABLE 5.—SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: TRADE AND VIOLENCE BY REGION AND TIME
Variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
SASIA EASIA SSAFR MIDEAF LATCA HIGHIN LOWIN 1968–83 1984–99 cty  yr Lag Imports
BOTHIN 0.696*
[0.416]
0.280**
[0.126]
	0.167
[0.127]
0.097
[0.110]
0.131
[0.088]
0.252**
[0.121]
0.017
[0.106]
	0.349***
[0.088]
0.244***
[0.088]
0.312***
[0.073]
0.230***
[0.060]
	0.053
[0.105]
ONEIN 0.388
[0.386]
0.187*
[0.109]
	0.285**
[0.114]
	0.004
[0.088]
0.033
[0.083]
0.186
[0.129]
	0.107
[0.091]
	0.161**
[0.066]
0.107
[0.084]
0.150**
[0.063]
0.108*
[0.059]
	0.043
[0.093]
GSP 0.006
[0.151]
0.278***
[0.097]
0.479***
[0.057]
0.538***
[0.085]
0.298***
[0.058]
0.317***
[0.031]
0.447***
[0.052]
0.385***
[0.031]
0.601***
[0.048]
0.549***
[0.032]
0.531***
[0.034]
0.408***
[0.043]
LDIST 	1.172***
[0.277]
	1.417***
[0.163]
	1.670***
[0.082]
	1.660***
[0.129]
	1.713***
[0.077]
	1.335***
[0.038]
	1.415***
[0.054]
	1.272***
[0.030]
	1.479***
[0.029]
	1.437***
[0.025]
	1.391***
[0.026]
	1.381***
[0.034]
LRGDP 0.354***
[0.119]
0.784***
[0.131]
0.095
[0.085]
0.748***
[0.097]
0.734***
[0.092]
0.298***
[0.064]
0.162**
[0.075]
0.305***
[0.073]
0.805***
[0.080]
0.790***
[0.016]
0.301***
[0.049]
LRGDPi 0.955***
[0.123]
LRGDPj 	0.157
[0.141]
LRGDPPC 	0.162
[0.119]
	0.233*
[0.140]
0.249***
[0.088]
	0.195*
[0.106]
	0.148
[0.094]
0.393***
[0.070]
0.180**
[0.076]
0.439***
[0.097]
	0.728***
[0.080]
0.033
[0.023]
0.198***
[0.050]
LRGDPPCi 	0.230*
[0.123]
LRGDPPCj 1.555***
[0.145]
REGIONAL 0.149***
[0.024]
0.307***
[0.034]
0.208***
[0.023]
0.213***
[0.035]
0.378***
[0.029]
0.235***
[0.021]
0.252***
[0.020]
0.274***
[0.019]
0.271***
[0.033]
CUSTRICT 1.096
[0.774]
1.399***
[0.315]
1.478***
[0.192]
	0.522
[0.795]
0.012
[0.236]
0.723**
[0.292]
1.578***
[0.187]
1.135***
[0.161]
1.123***
[0.183]
1.096***
[0.144]
1.156***
[0.152]
0.820***
[0.203]
COMLANG 0.104
[0.154]
0.037
[0.130]
0.298***
[0.085]
0.091
[0.119]
0.589***
[0.082]
0.330***
[0.056]
0.117
[0.077]
0.206***
[0.053]
0.351***
[0.054]
0.252***
[0.047]
0.277***
[0.047]
0.322***
[0.062]
BORDER 	0.716
[0.636]
	0.591
[0.380]
1.134***
[0.179]
0.068
[0.249]
	0.3
[0.195]
	0.391**
[0.164]
0.877***
[0.171]
0.260**
[0.128]
0.506***
[0.116]
0.296***
[0.105]
0.371***
[0.108]
0.221*
[0.126]
COMCOL 0.336*
[0.202]
0.483***
[0.166]
0.467***
[0.110]
0.830***
[0.148]
0.511***
[0.155]
0.041
[0.107]
0.551***
[0.098]
0.462***
[0.082]
0.628***
[0.080]
0.615***
[0.069]
0.563***
[0.071]
0.276***
[0.095]
CURCOL 0
[0.000]
1.639***
[0.296]
	0.49
[0.861]
0.904***
[0.314]
1.133***
[0.225]
0.665
[0.433]
	0.204
[1.213]
0.836**
[0.380]
	0.333
[0.535]
0.629*
[0.370]
0.51
[0.412]
0.459
[0.453]
COLONY 0.221
[0.257]
1.104***
[0.265]
1.693***
[0.146]
0.597**
[0.247]
0.848***
[0.157]
1.277***
[0.099]
1.458***
[0.157]
1.352***
[0.104]
1.147***
[0.108]
1.256***
[0.101]
1.240***
[0.101]
1.241***
[0.127]
TERIF 	0.051**
[0.024]
	0.102***
[0.021]
	0.044***
[0.017]
	0.073***
[0.022]
	0.063***
[0.016]
	0.039***
[0.010]
	0.064***
[0.014]
	0.017*
[0.011]
	0.063***
[0.013]
	0.074***
[0.010]
	0.049***
[0.008]
	0.055***
[0.021]
TERIFi j t	1 	0.026***
[0.008]
Observations 16450 32021 75445 33704 61838 106991 92322 86861 112367 199228 187108 27530
R-squared 0.75 0.72 0.59 0.69 0.69 0.82 0.62 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.72
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The results in this table are estimated from either equation
(1) for 177 countries from 1968 to 1999. Each column is for the basic gravity model including time and country fixed effects. Each column represents a different region or time period. SASIA is South Asia, EASIA
is East Asia, MIDEAF is the Middle East and North Africa, LATCA is Latin America and the Caribbean, HIGHIN is high-income countries, LOWIN is low-income countries, cty  yr includes time and country
dummies interacted with each other, Lag represents the regression that includes an additional lag of TERIF, and Imports is a regression with the log of imports included as the dependent variable.
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trade flows (for example, WTO/GATT) are not as important
as the adoption of generalized systems of preference
(GSPs). From the analysis presented in this paper, it appears
that the effect of conflict on trade is quite strong—even
larger than that of GSPs.
What are the policy implications of our paper? Although
pursuing trade promotion through bilateral vehicles like
GSPs has important effects on trade, another avenue is
likely to have a larger one peace. We find peace has a large
and positive effect on trade. This is obviously only a lower
bound on the welfare gain to peace, though it is an important
component to raising economic welfare.
Along the same line, Hess (2003) analyzes the consump-
tion welfare loss from internal and external conflict in order
to answer the question: “How much would individuals be
willing to pay to avoid just the economic costs of conflict?”
Remarkably, his estimates suggest that these pure economic
welfare losses from conflict are quite large: on average,
individuals who live in a country that has experienced some
conflict since 1960 would permanently give up to approxi-
mately 8% of their current level of consumption to live in a
purely peaceful world. Taken together, the large potential
welfare gains to consumption identified in Hess (2003), in
addition to those from bilateral trade identified in this paper,
suggests that economists and policymakers should continue
to investigate and advocate domestic and international in-
stitutions that promote peace in order to realize such gains.
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